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Abstract
1. Successful detection of introduced marine pests (IMP) relies upon effective sur-
veillance. However, the expedience of responding following IMP detection is 
often dependent upon the relationship between regulators and stakeholders.
2. Effective detection of IMP in areas such as commercial ports requires a collab-
orative approach, as port environments can be highly complex both above and 
below the water. This complexity can encompass physical, logistical, safety and 
legislative issues. With this in mind, the aquatic pest biosecurity section within 
the Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) devel-
oped the State-Wide Array Surveillance Program (SWASP) in collaboration with 
Western Australian Port Authorities and port industry stakeholders.
3. The SWASP is primarily based on passive settlement arrays for IMP detection. 
Arrays are deployed at strategic locations within Ports. Marine growth samples 
collected from the arrays are processed using Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS) 
to identify the presence of IMP within a specific geographical location.
4. Over 8 years, participation in SWASP has grown from 3 to 11 ports, spanning over 
11,000 km, from the tropical north to temperate south of Western Australia. The 
programme has proven to be highly effective as a means of fostering stakeholder 
involvement and, importantly for IMP surveillance. The growth and success of 
SWASP has continued primarily because of the commitment and farsightedness 
of the ports involved. The regular presence of the biosecurity regulator as a part-
ner in SWASP has provided a consistent face for biosecurity and fostered good 
stakeholder relationships, ensuring there is a reliable and effective ongoing ma-
rine surveillance programme for the state.
5. Synthesis and applications. Through a united and collaborative approach to ma-
rine biosecurity surveillance, port authorities, industry and biosecurity regulators 
have developed the State-Wide Array Surveillance Program (SWASP) and closed a 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
The global spread of marine species is recognized as a threat to 
coastal ecosystems and their associated values (e.g. Bax, Williamson, 
Aguero, Gonzalez, & Geeves, 2003; Costello et al., 2010; Molnar, 
Gamboa, Revenga, & Spalding, 2008). While species can spread by 
many means, some marine areas, such as ports, are more susceptible 
than others to the establishment of introduced marine pests (IMP; 
Floerl, Inglis, Dey, & Smith, 2009). This is a consequence of the rise 
in international vessel movement in recent decades via the prolif-
eration of trade and tourism, resulting in an exponential increase in 
marine species being translocated to areas outside of their natural 
ranges (Carlton, Keith, & Ruiz 2019; Floerl et al., 2009; Hulme, 2009; 
Leung et al., 2002; Levine & D'Antonino, 2003). Introduced marine 
pest are 75% more likely to become established in busy ports than 
quieter locations, and in turn, these ports can increase the likelihood 
of spread of IMP to other areas (Floerl et al., 2009). Ports per se are 
not creating the risk; rather, they are the nodes through which ves-
sels arriving from international destinations can potentially relocate 
IMP through ballast water or hull biofouling. While there are some 
regulatory controls to reduce the likelihood of IMP translocation into 
Australian waters (DAWR, 2017; WA Govt, 1994; 2016), ports oper-
ating as transport hubs (nodes) have a vested interest in limiting the 
potential establishment of any IMP and will benefit from implement-
ing IMP surveillance and management programmes. Ports interests 
primarily lie in their environmental licence to operate which under the 
Environmental Protection Act (1986) requires protection of the envi-
ronment managed by the port. The protection of the trade (economic 
value) that flows through ports in Australia/WA is also a key driver as 
a pest outbreak could impact trade in/out of the affected port.
Introduced marine pests surveillance can be logistically chal-
lenging and economically expensive to undertake. The ability to 
conduct IMP surveillance is constrained by the very nature of the 
marine environment, which is generally large and complex, with high 
biological diversity that is often not fully appreciated or understood 
(Giangrande, 2003; St. Pierre & Kovalenko, 2014). Commercial ports 
typically have highly complex environments both above and below 
the water. As these conditions are often compounded by logistic, 
legislative, operational and safety issues, the implementation of 
surveillance programmes can be particularly challenging. These con-
straints can limit what can be achieved, requiring marine surveillance 
to be specific to the port environment and fit for purpose to ensure 
that IMP can be detected and managed effectively.
Early detection is the most cost-effective way of minimizing the 
risk of IMP establishing and their subsequent management (Coutts & 
Forrest, 2007; Kaiser & Burnett, 2010; Marchetti, Moyle, & Levine, 
2004; Simberloff et al., 2013). Once established in a new habitat, 
IMP are notoriously difficult to eradicate (Coutts & Forrest, 2007; 
Hewitt & Campbell, 2007; Meyerson & Reaser, 2002; Thresher & 
Kuris, 2004).
Successful management of IMP incursions relies upon several 
key factors. These include the following:
• identification of vectors and risk pathways and alignment with 
measures to reduce IMP introduction likelihood,
• awareness (by all) of the potential risk of incursions, and appropri-
ate protocols and surveillance for early detection and identifica-
tion of IMP showing pest-like characteristics,
• rapid response following the detection of potential IMP, and 
importantly,
• support and cooperation between stakeholders (e.g. industry, 
public) and regulatory agencies in the response process (Piola & 
McDonald, 2012).
Early IMP detection is most likely to occur and be effective if cohe-
sive surveillance and management programmes are in place (Bax et al., 
2001; Mehta, Haight, Homans, Polasky, & Venette, 2007), with IMP 
surveillance programmes linking regulatory agencies to port operators 
and industry stakeholders generally thought to be the most effective 
(e.g. Piola & McDonald, 2012). An effective response to an IMP incur-
sion can hinge upon this collaborative arrangement, as early detec-
tion and reporting may prove ineffective if a rapid and coordinated 
major gap in biosecurity surveillance. The SWASP collaboration uses passive set-
tlement arrays and molecular analyses to provide regular marine pest surveillance 
from the tropics to temperate regions of Western Australia. The continued com-
mitment has embedded valuable relationships between stakeholder and regulator 
ensuring ongoing surveillance in marine biosecurity for the state. The Western 
Australian SWASP example has inspired other jurisdictions around Australia to 
develop similar collaborative approaches which will have far-reaching marine bios-
ecurity benefits.
K E Y W O R D S
biosecurity, collaboration, marine pest, partnership, port, programme, stakeholder, 
surveillance
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response is not subsequently applied (McAllister et al., 2017). Yet to 
the best of our knowledge, such joint or cooperative surveillance pro-
grammes are rare both within Australia and world-wide.
This manuscript highlights the importance of cooperation and 
collaboration between regulatory agencies, Port Authorities and 
industry stakeholders to manage IMP surveillance in commercial 
ports. We showcase the growth and development of an IMP sur-
veillance programme from one site at a single port to a state-wide 
stakeholder-driven IMP surveillance programme, including the les-
sons learned from the evolution of this approach.
2  | NATION-WIDE SURVEILL ANCE 
PROGR AMMES: SUCCESSES AND 
LIMITATIONS
Australia and New Zealand, being ocean-bound nations, are par-
ticularly dependent upon shipping for transportation of goods 
(Piola & McDonald, 2012). These countries have wide-ranging ap-
proaches to marine biosecurity (DAWR, 2017; 2019; DoE, 2015; 
Hewitt & Campbell, 2007; MPI, 2018), primarily in response to the 
high risk of introduction and establishment of IMP faced through 
the ever-increasing vessel movements (see CLIA, 2017; Floerl et al., 
2009; Seebens, Gastner, & Blasius 2013). In 2002, the New Zealand 
government commenced a national surveillance programme at 
11 high-risk ports and marinas around New Zealand (Ministry for 
Primary Industries, 2017). Similarly in 2010, the Australian gov-
ernment implemented the National System for the Prevention and 
Management of Marine Pest Incursions (hereafter National System) 
aimed at decreasing the risk of IMP establishing in Australia and re-
ducing the impact and spread of IMP already present (DAFF, 2010). 
The National System aimed to detect and manage IMP in 18 high-
risk ports throughout the country. The locations were determined 
primarily on the number of vessel movements, with an assumption 
that the greater number of vessels the greater the likelihood of IMP 
incursion. The National System used a process of listed target spe-
cies, known surveillance detection method probabilities, and de-
fined sample effort to achieve an overall programme confidence. 
Following a species-based approach, the system focused effort on 
extensive sampling of all potential habitat types for each target spe-
cies rather than a more fit-for-purpose sampling regime appropriate 
to the risk vectors and port environment. The System was seen as 
a breakthrough in Australia and internationally, in terms of being a 
programme that was agreed to nation-wide, with a robust design and 
a consistent approach to marine biosecurity surveillance.
Both the Australian and New Zealand marine biosecurity sur-
veillance programmes were managed and operated by government 
regulatory agencies. The New Zealand monitoring programme has 
been highly successful and is an ongoing central-government-funded 
programme (Ministry for Primary Industries, 2017). The Australian 
National System, although based on the same principles, has met 
with difficulties, particularly in relation to implementation and main-
tenance of the programme across the States and Territories. Perhaps 
one of the key differences between the approaches of the two coun-
tries was that the NZ surveillance was centrally funded. Due to a lack 
of centralized funding or strategic coordination, there were inherent 
difficulties associated with applying the Australian system across 
state boundaries that the New Zealand system did not encounter.
In practice, there were considerable shortcomings associated 
with implementing the Australian National System. Like the New 
Zealand surveillance programme, the National System relied upon 
large skilled teams, to implement the programme and was onerous 
in terms of the amount of field surveillance effort required. New 
Zealand has somewhat overcome this hurdle by outsourcing the sur-
veillance to a provider with dedicated, well-trained consistent teams. 
Most states in Australia lacked dedicated and capable staff to imple-
ment the field and laboratory-based aspects of the programme. High 
operational costs, often requiring in excess of AUD$350,000 per 
port surveillance event, and slow post-survey processing of samples 
for identification made the National System unwieldy. Furthermore, 
as the programme was only to be implemented every 2 years, it was 
likely that an IMP could become established in the port between 
surveillance events.
Despite the nation-wide agreement, the National System was 
implemented in only five out of the 18 specified locations, with the 
majority of states never implementing the System at all. These lim-
itations amounted to critical shortcomings in terms of the National 
System being an effective nation-wide programme.
In Western Australia, the National System ran for 5 years (2011–
2015) through state government funding and targeted each of the 
locations assessed as having a high risk of potential IMP incursion; 
the ports of Dampier, Fremantle and Port Hedland. In addition to the 
high costs of implementation, access to many areas within ports such 
as Dampier and Port Hedland were restricted due to safety exclu-
sion zones around port terminal operations and the risk associated 
with hazardous marine fauna (e.g. crocodiles). This limited in-water 
activities in certain areas and all surveillance staff were required to 
meet strict occupational health and safety, diving, and oil and gas 
project-specific standards (in Dampier), well above those generally 
required within regulatory agencies. Due to these limitations, con-
tinuing the National System in Western Australia was not considered 
viable. Given the importance of IMP surveillance, refining the scope 
and resource requirements of the programme was deemed neces-
sary, and resulted in substantial retractions of surveillance activities 
in the aforementioned port environments.
Recognizing the limitations associated with implementing 
the National System, the Aquatic Biosecurity section within the 
Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development 
(DPIRD), Western Australia (hereafter known as the Department) 
explored alternatives to ensure a consistent and more cost-effective 
IMP surveillance programme. The Department developed a new ap-
proach to IMP surveillance, in which collaboration and cooperation 
with port and industry stakeholders were actively sought. This re-
sulted in port stakeholders and the Department working in tandem 
to share ideas, costs and knowledge to develop and implement an 
IMP surveillance programme.
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3  | DE VELOPMENT OF A COLL ABOR ATIVE 
SURVEILL ANCE PROGR AMME
To engage the port stakeholders in a more cost-effective IMP 
surveillance programme, the early warning system (EWS) was im-
plemented in Western Australia in 2010. At the time of imple-
mentation, the EWS was developed to provide passive year-round 
in-water surveillance to complement the larger National System. The 
array programme also complimented the smaller targeted surveil-
lance programmes conducted during interim years in the three WA 
National System ports.
Under the EWS surveillance programme, a range of IMP detec-
tion tools were used. This included settlement arrays, crab traps, crab 
condos and shoreline surveillance. Each of these methods have been 
shown to be effective tools in IMP surveillance (Hewitt & McDonald, 
2013; Marraffini, Ashton, Brown, Chang, & Ruiz, 2017; Tait & Inglis, 
2016). For example, settlement arrays consist of a set of small plastic 
plates that provide vacant space upon which marine organisms can 
settle and grow (Figure 1). Arrays rely on the way in which organisms 
naturally encounter a settlement surface as they are dispersed through 
the surrounding environment, there is no specific attractant for the 
organism aside from the vacant settlement surface or other organisms 
that settle on that surface.
The cooperative development of the EWS between the initial 
participants led to a high level of trust and engagement associated 
with the implementation of the programme. This resulted in the 
expansion of the EWS to more ports along the Western Australian 
coastline. Currently, there are 11 State and private ports voluntarily 
involved in this collaborative approach to IMP surveillance inter-
spersed along approximately 11,000 km of the Western Australian 
coastline (Figure 2).
3.1 | Developing a collaborative surveillance 
programme—version 1.0
The initial version of the EWS, deployed settlement arrays (Figure 1) 
within each port four times a year. In consultation with port staff, ar-
rays were situated in areas where the interaction with high-risk vec-
tors (e.g. international and relocating domestic vessels) was greatest 
while eliminating potential impacts on vessel operations or safety. To 
favour potential entrainment of larvae, array placement considera-
tions also included port hydrodynamics as well as protection from en-
vironmental and physical disturbance (wave action, swell, ship wake 
and frictional wear). After a 3-month immersion period, arrays were 
removed from the water and analysed visually by trained Department 
F I G U R E  1   Image of the settlement array structure showing the floatation and metal arms complete with square plastic plates (left hand 
side). The structure sits approximately 1m below the water’s surface. The arms each contain both horizontal and vertical plates constructed 
of PVC. These plates provide a clean ‘competition free’ substrate for any marine larvae to settle on. These arrays are deployed in ports along 
the Western Australian coastline and provide an early warning system for the detection of any founding populations of introduced marine 
pests as well as a record of other marine organisms in the surveys area. The arrays are immersed in water for a period of two months (right 
hand side) after which they are retrieved by Port staff, photographed and the images and plates sent to marine pest experts for examination 
and analysis using molecular tools to detect if a marine pest is present. 
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staff for the presence/absence of IMP, or taxa displaying pest-like 
characteristics. Integral to the collegial nature of the programme was 
that port staff were directly involved in the deployment and retrieval 
of sampling equipment and collection of samples. Crab traps and con-
dos were deployed by Departmental staff at the same sites 24 hr prior 
to array removal. After 24-hr immersion Department and port staff 
would remove arrays, traps, condos and also undertake shoreline sur-
veillance, searching through wrack and debris on the shore for algae, 
shells, crabs and crab carapaces for any evidence of IMP. This provided 
the opportunity to enhance engagement with the port's staff by pro-
viding them with ongoing training in IMP identification and awareness. 
This version of the EWS programme was limited to those organisms 
that could be readily identified through morphological examination 
and taxonomic identification.
3.2 | Enhancing a collaborative surveillance 
programme—version 2.0
In 2015, the Department undertook a review of its marine biosecu-
rity surveillance programmes. Within the EWS programme, the review 
highlighted the potential to move from a traditional taxonomic identi-
fication approach to one based on utilizing new molecular-based tools. 
The reliance on visual identification of samples was biased towards 
high-to-medium abundance organisms that were easily identifiable 
and meant that many organisms had to reach a certain size before they 
could be identified. Similar to the National System, seeking specialist 
advice to verify a species identification was often limited due to as-
sociated cost, time constraints and diminishing taxonomic expertise 
(Visher, 1996). Thus, the development of molecular-based tools was 
F I G U R E  2   Location of ports involved 
in State-wide Array Surveillance Program. 
Base map courtesy of Google Maps
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identified as a mechanism that could assist with the early detection and 
identification of IMP. In particular, this technology could theoretically 
detect and identify larvae, juveniles, fragments (pieces or shed cells) 
from organisms that may not be possible using traditional approaches.
The EWS was transitioned into the State-Wide Array Surveillance 
Program (SWASP) in mid-2016. The rebranding was appropriate 
based on the incorporation of the new molecular-based approach 
(Next-Generation Sequencing NGS) and the far-reaching and inclu-
sive nature of the programme. During the transitional phase (mid 
2016–mid 2017), the sampling periodicity was changed from four 
to two deployments (summer and winter only), allowing for greater 
temporal flexibility while the new methodologies, analytics and re-
porting processes underwent development. Methods were refined 
to focus on the settlement arrays and shoreline surveillance within 
each Port. In addition to the detection of target IMP, NGS has pro-
vided a more detailed window into the marine biodiversity that exists 
in each port environment which through the SWASP molecular pro-
filing has been shown to have high species diversity and complexity.
The programme has been highly successful to date for both the 
regulator and stakeholders, with growth in mutual trust, commu-
nication and confidence. The success of the programme is exempli-
fied by recommendation of the SWASP by port collaborators to their 
counterparts and regulators in other parts of Australia, as a suitable, 
cost-effective programme for marine biosecurity surveillance.
Although there are some limitations of the SWASP in terms of 
spatial sampling, the programme has many positive attributes that 
set it apart from the National System.
• The direct contribution of the WA Port Authorities and industry 
partners to the development of the SWASP system has engen-
dered a sense of stakeholder ownership towards the programme, 
which brings with it a willingness to continue surveillance, sup-
port research developments and to share information beyond any 
direct regulatory requirement.
• The SWASP is cost-effective (approximately 10% p.a. of National 
System costings).
• Surveillance occurs in ports every 6 months under SWASP. This 
change in frequency alone greatly increases the likelihood of de-
tecting an IMP.
• Finally, and most importantly, the SWASP is an ongoing pro-
gramme that has had major uptake through the collaborative ap-
proach between regulators and stakeholders.
4  | THE PATH FORWARD: LESSONS 
LE ARNED FOR ENHANCING BIOSECURIT Y 
SURVEILL ANCE THROUGH COOPER ATION 
BET WEEN REGUL ATORY AGENCIES AND 
INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS
The SWASP has proven to be a very effective tool for IMP surveil-
lance and, importantly, a means of valuing and engaging stakehold-
ers. To date, the authors are not aware of any other truly collaborative 
approach where stakeholders, such as State ports and private opera-
tors, have actively funded, helped develop, refined and implemented 
IMP surveillance without any external pressure, which is typically 
driven through regulatory controls and licencing. Regular presence and 
consistent messaging of Department staff through the SWASP have 
provided a face for biosecurity and fostered and maintained ongoing 
stakeholder relationships. In some instances, State ports have engage-
ment with individual port operators (tenants), sharing the information 
and costs associated with the individual port surveillance programmes. 
The continued engagement by the Department reinforces a biosecu-
rity presence, and supports the need for biosecurity surveillance and 
reporting outside of formal regulatory mechanisms.
As the programme is predominantly stakeholder funded, the 
Department has been working to maintain its cost-effectiveness 
while optimizing particular aspects. In their recent review of set-
tlement arrays as a surveillance tool, Tait and Inglis (2016) highlight 
that species with short larval life spans (hours) or aggregated with 
settlement patterns may require sampling surfaces located close to 
spawning point, or conversely, surfaces that are more widely dis-
persed to encounter any ‘swarm’ of propagules. The Department is 
currently optimizing array site selection through three-dimensional 
environmental modelling to predict potential dispersal for different 
larval types under varying conditions. The likelihood of a propagule 
encountering an array is determined by the concentration of larvae 
in the water and the movement of that water over time. Modelling 
of different larval types (e.g. passive and neutrally buoyant, active 
swimmers with phototaxic responses) from vessel berthing areas will 
also be conducted over a range of temporal scales. The accumula-
tion and analysis of these dispersal patterns will help identify likely 
hotspots for optimum array deployment. Once site optimization has 
occurred, we will work with our port and industry stakeholders to 
review deployment locations, retrieval times and the number of rep-
licates at each site to increase programme confidence.
The Department is also refining the molecular-based tools within 
the SWASP to provide greater confidence in detection and identifica-
tion and to reduce processing costs and times. Currently, techniques are 
restricted to parts of the genome such as 18s, 16s or CO1. By targeting 
a greater number of unique regions across more of a species genome for 
each target species, we can potentially increase diagnostic specificity 
and confidence. The ultimate aim of the abovementioned work is that 
each port will have a tailored surveillance programme designed to offer 
greater confidence in IMP detection that is better value for money.
The success of the SWASP is based on the formation of a shared 
collaborative approach to marine pest surveillance between port 
stakeholders and the Department. This success has been recognized 
in the field of biosecurity at both State (Western Australia Golden 
Gecko Award for Environmental Excellence 2018) and national lev-
els (Australian Biosecurity Award for a significant contribution to 
maintaining Australia's biosecurity integrity 2019). Through the de-
velopment process, many valuable lessons have been learned that 
should be taken into consideration by regulators and stakeholders 
who are contemplating undertaking similar biosecurity surveillance 
programmes. These focal lessons include the following:
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1. Work with bodies that are willing to work with you. Do not 
spend initial efforts in ongoing dialogue with those who do 
not wish to participate. Our experience has shown the value 
of the initial participants, even though they may not be located 
within highest risk areas. These ground-breaking participants 
can influence others to join via the groundswell of acceptance 
and participating peer pressure.
2. Do not aim for perfection in the initial surveillance programme, 
rather the understanding should be that ‘something is better than 
nothing’. It is important to develop a collaborative approach to 
surveillance that parties can agree upon. The sampling regime 
and fine-tuning of the surveillance protocol can be built upon and 
evolve as time progresses.
3. Understand that a single system will not fit every environment: 
threats, habitats and stakeholders vary. Consequently, an effec-
tive surveillance system has to be adaptable to risk and size.
4. Be open to learning from your stakeholders. Stakeholders have a 
wealth of knowledge and consequently are better situated to advise 
on their environment and specific considerations for implementation. 
Regulators need to listen and learn from stakeholders, and in this way, 
a constructive and effective surveillance pathway can be created.
5. Finally, and most importantly, work together. Do not try and im-
pose a rigid regulatory approach where one party dictates to the 
other. A truly collaborative programme will achieve greater par-
ticipation and as a consequence, far greater success. Biosecurity 
should always be a shared responsibility, and a united front is the 
only way forward in the fight against marine invaders.
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